A federal judge has dismissed separate antitrust lawsuits brought by Chegg and Penske Media against Google over its AI-powered search practices, rejecting challenges to how the company obtains and repurposes publishers’ content. US District Judge Amit Mehta issued the opinion on September 30, 2026, in Washington. The dismissals were reported by Reuters, Ars Technica and The Verge. (law.justia.com)
The companies alleged that Google used its search-market power to obtain material for AI features without payment while diverting visitors from their websites. The outcome is a setback for those challenges, not a general determination that every use of publishers’ work in AI search is lawful. The allegations of coercion, lost traffic and revenue harm remain allegations, rather than established findings. (theverge.com)
Why the expected exchange of content for traffic mattered
A central distinction in Mehta’s reasoning concerned publishers’ expectation that making their content available to Google would bring visitors to their sites. He rejected the proposition that this expectation established an agreement. “But an expectation is not an agreement. It is simply how a general search engine works,” he wrote. (cases.justia.com)
That distinction addresses the legal basis of the publishers’ challenge, rather than measuring the value of their content or deciding whether fewer referrals would damage their businesses. Mehta acknowledged the predicament facing publishers and other creators, while explaining that antitrust rules could not substitute for legislative decisions about the economic consequences of innovation. (theverge.com)
Both companies filed their lawsuits in 2025. Chegg, an education and learning platform, alleged that Google scraped its educational material for AI uses that competed with its service. Penske, whose publications include Rolling Stone and Variety, objected to content made available for ordinary search also being used for AI answers without a separate opt-out. (arstechnica.com)
Their shared concern was that access to search audiences left them without a meaningful commercial choice over AI reuse. According to the reported allegations, refusing to supply content risked exclusion from search, while allowing its use could enable answers that reduced the need to visit the original source. That account describes the plaintiffs’ position, not an independently established assessment of Google’s practices. (economictimes.indiatimes.com)
What the decision does—and does not—establish
The court’s rejection of these antitrust challenges should not be treated as a copyright clearance for AI search. Whether particular content uses require permission, what compensation publishers should receive and whether conduct violates competition law are distinct questions. The opinion addresses the claims before the court; it does not provide a universal answer to disputes over AI and publishing. (law.justia.com)
The opinion grants Google’s dismissal motions in both actions and describes an accompanying order as final and appealable. That establishes the possibility of appellate review, not that either plaintiff has filed an appeal. Current appeal filings and whether further amendment is available could not be independently verified from complete, up-to-date dockets during preparation of this draft. (law.justia.com)
Reuters reported on October 1 that Google, Chegg and Penske had not immediately responded to its requests for comment. Those were Reuters’ requests, not outreach conducted for this article. No direct responses from the companies were obtained for this draft. The Verge also disclosed that it is part of Penske Media, a relationship relevant when weighing its coverage alongside other reporting. (economictimes.indiatimes.com)
Other jurisdictions are addressing publisher control
Separate regulatory developments show why the US dismissals do not resolve the wider policy debate. On June 3, 2026, Britain’s Competition and Markets Authority imposed a requirement giving publishers more control over the use of their content in Google’s generative-AI search features. The authority also required clearer attribution and links to source material. (gov.uk)
The UK requirements extend beyond an opt-out. They call for understandable information about how Google uses publishers’ search content and detailed metrics on user engagement with that content in generative-AI search features. For media businesses, those measures address practical questions about visibility and measurement alongside control over reuse. They operate under Britain’s digital-markets regime, separately from these US lawsuits. (gov.uk)
The European Commission also announced an antitrust investigation in December 2025 into Google’s use of online content for AI. Its stated concerns included potentially unfair terms for publishers and privileged access to content that could disadvantage rival AI developers. The announcement described questions for investigation, not findings of a violation. (germany.representation.ec.europa.eu)
Together, those developments illustrate the limits of treating any single ruling as a worldwide settlement of AI-search economics. The immediate US development is the dismissal of Chegg’s and Penske’s particular challenges. Publisher control, attribution and bargaining power remain subjects of separate regulatory action—not questions answered simply by Google’s success in these cases. (law.justia.com)
